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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMON C~USE OF UTAH, an unincorporated 
assoclatlon by MARJORIE J. THOMAS, on 
behalf of its members, and MARJORIE J. 
THOMAS, an individual, 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
-vs-
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and MILLY 
0. BERNARD, OLOF E. ZUNDEL and KENNETH 
RIGRTUP, in their capacities as Commis-
sioners of the PUBLIC SERVICE COMMIS-
SION, real parties in interest, 
Defendants and Appellants, 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, 
Defendant-Intervenor and 
Appellant. 
Appeal No. 15685 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
MOUNTAIN STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for declaratory judgment under the Utah 
Declaratory Judgment Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-33-1, et ~· (Repl. 
vol. 1977) brought by the Respondents (hereinafter referred to as 
"Common Cause") against the Utah Public Service Commission (herein-
after referred to as the "Commission") and its individual commis-
sioners Milly 0. Bernard, Olof E. Zundel and Kenneth Rigtrup (here-
inafter referred to as the "Commissioners"). 
Respondents seek a determination that the judicial delibera-
tions of the Commission, when it votes upon, establishes, or other-
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wise evaluates existing or proposed utility rates, tolls and charg~, 
rentals or classifications, is subject to the Open and Public Meet-
ings Act, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1, et seq. (1977 Supp.). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On January 24, 1978, The Honorable Peter F. Leary, District 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court, after granting Respond-
ent's Motion for Summary Judgment on all issues and denying Appel-
lant's Motion for Summary Judgment, entered a final judgment declar· 
ing that the Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§52-4-1 et ~- (1977 Supp.), applies to and governs the meetings 
of the Commission when deliberating, voting upon, establishing, or 
otherwise evaluating existing or proposed public utility rates, 
tolls, charges, rentals or classifications. Appellants seek a rever· 
sal of that final judgment. 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
Mountain States Legal Foundation (MSLF) is a non-profit, public 
interest law center serving the eight mountain states. Its offices 
are located at 1845 Sherman Street, Suite 675, Denver, Colorado 
80203. Its purpose is to engage in legal research, study and analys: 
for the benefit of the general public as to the effect of evolving 
concepts of law on our democratic institutions and to provide repre-
sentation to assist other organizations in providing legal represen-
tations on matters of general public interest at all levels of the 
administrative and judicial processes. Its Board of Directors and 
Board of Litigation, which control the affairs of the MSLF, are 
-2-
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composed of citizens of the State of Utah, as well as residents of 
the other seven mountain states. Its members and support come from 
the eight mountain states. 
Many of the supporters of MSLF are Utah consumers and are dir-
ectly affected by decisions made and actions taken by the Utah Public 
Service Commission. MSLF seeks, through its participation in this 
matter, to represent the interests of these supporters. Mountain 
States Legal Foundation believes the trial court's ruling that the 
Utah Open and Public Meetings Act, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-1, et seq. 
(1977 Supp.) applies to and governs the quasi-judicial deliberations 
of the Utah Public Service Commission to be in error and contrary to 
the laws of the State of Utah. Because of the effect that this rul-
ing will have upon the supporters of MSLF, MSLF supports the motions 
of Appellants Commission, Commissioners, and Mountain Fuel Supply 
Company that the final judgment of the trial court be reversed and 
that this court declare that, as a matter of law, said adjudicatory 
functions of the Commission are not within the purview of the Utah 
Open and Public Meetings Act. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae agrees with and adopts the statement of facts set 
forth in the briefs of Appellants. 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ARE 
QUASI-JUDICIAL 
The question before this Court is whether the Commission must 
open its deliberations and decision making process to the public. 
In essence, must the Commission open its collective thought processe: 
its collective reasoning used in deciding a particular case, its we~ 
ing of evidence and witness credibility to public and political scru-
tiny and influence. 
The result which the Commission seeks, and which MSFL supports, 
is only that the judicial deliberations of the Commission not be 
subject to the open meetings act. The Commission encourages public 
participation in Commission hearings, where the evidence and the 
testimony on which the Corrunssion bases its decision is proffered. 
Only when the Commission seeks to evaluate the evidence and testi-
mony, weighing the credibility and probative value of testimony and 
evidence, does the Commission seek refuge from the public eye. 
Exempting these deliberations from the Utah Open and Public 
Meetings Act does not mean that Commission decisions will be based 
on improper considerations. The Commission, just as a trial court, 
must enter Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgments and 
Orders based thereon. Final actions of the Commission are taken 
pursuant to written, well reasoned opinions. Individual Commissione: 
may dissent in separate written opinions. The factors which the Co~ 
mission finds controlling are there enumerated and their conclusion 
based upon those factors is stated. The Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are applicable to the review of Commission cases. 54-7-16 U .c.: 
-4-
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(Repl. Vol. 1974). The limited exemption sought serves only to 
allow the Commission to reach a conclusion with complete candor 
among themselves, the same candor guaranteed a judge or jury act-
ing as fact finder. The importance of the availability of this 
internal candor is apparent when it is realized that the Commis-
sion's functions in this area are essentially judicial. 
The judicial character of the Commission has been recognized 
in Utah. In Wycoff Co. v. Public Service Commission, 13 Utah 2d 
123, 369 P.2d 283 (1962), this Court succinctly stated that: 
There is no question that in performing its multi-
various duties in franchising and regulating public 
utilities the Commission is required to and does 
perform some functions of a judicial or quasi-
judicial nature; ••. (369 P.2d at 285). 
The conclusion reached in the Wycoff case is apparent from the pro-
cedures used by the Commission. The Commission adjudicates parti-
cular matters, with each franchise or rate adjustment being a 
separate proceeding before the Commission. The parties to these 
proceedings file pleadings, complaints and answers raising issues of 
fact and law. The Commission has subpoena power and discovery pro-
cesses are open to counsel representing the par~ies. The Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and Utah Rules of Evidence are applicable, though 
the hearsay rule is somewhat relaxed. Counsel may represent parties 
before the Commission, engaging in oral argument with direct and 
cross examination and submitting written briefs. The competency of 
witnesses are judged in accordance with judicially accepted principles. 
The Commission issues Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as does 
a judicial body. 
-5-
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I 
Only when the Commission seeks to deliberate upon issues of fac· 
and law, which have been presented to it in the classic adversary 
format, does the Commission seeks exemption from the Open and Public 
Heetings Act. Deference to the property rights of the utility and i 
its shareholders require the utmost regard, and the individual natura 
of these determinations reaffirms the judicial nature of these pro-
ceedings. 
Specifically, the Legislature, in separating the functions of 
the Department of Business Regulations and the quasi-judicial and 
rule making function of the Commission, has recognized the distinct 
nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and the need to insulate those 
proceedings from any outside influence: 
The Public Service Commission shall not be subject 
to the jurisdictlon of the Executive Director of 
Business Regulation in regard to the exercise of 
its quasi-judicial or rule making functions within 
the Department . • . The Public Service Commission 
shall exercise all quasi-judicial and rule making 
powers in regards to public utilities as provided 
in Title 54. (Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1. 3 (Repl. 
Vol. 1973). 
The above quoted section illustrates that the Legislature not 
only recognizes the quasi-judicial function of the Commission, but 
also that the Legislature recognizes the need to insulate that func· 
tion from any possible taint of influence. The need for such insu~ 
ation is inherent in judicial processes. That the Commission exer-
cises judicial proceedings is clear from the definition given to s~ 
proceedings by the Arizona Supreme Court in Arizona Press Club, Inc. 
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The procedures prescribed by the statute and 
followed by the Board of Tax Appeals in hearing 
the parties in open forum, taking the matter under 
advisement, deliberating, writing a written deci-
sion and making that decision available to the 
parties and the public, follow the classic proce-
dures of an appellate court in making a judicial 
decision. . .. To allow the public to attend the 
deliberations leading to a decision and to watch 
the writing of that decision would not, we believe, 
promote the ends of justice. (558 P.2d at 699). 
The procedures used by the Board of Tax Appeals in Arizona have a 
direct analog in the procedures used by the Commission in deciding 
matters. Each follow the format of a court of law. The goal of each 
is a decision regarding a particular matter, based on evidence and 
testimony received regarding that matter. The Board of Tax Appeals, 
as the Commission here, seeks only to deliberate on and write the 
decision without constant publicity and sensationalism. Only the 
interim thought processes of the Commission are not open to the 
public; the conclusions and the reasoning of the Commission are con-
tained in final written decisions. 
The characterization by Common Cause of the Commission as merely 
an extension of the Legislature is not convincing. Admittedly, the 
Commission has been delegated the task of setting utility rates and 
granting franchises. However, analysis cannot end here, ignoring as 
it would the essential nature of the Commission's adjudicatory duties. 
The Legislature decided that the Commission's decision would be 
arrived at judicially, as opposed to legislatively. The Legislature 
provided that those quasi-judicial functions of the Commission would 
be insulated from influence from other divisions of the Department of 
Business Regulation. Utah Code Ann. §13-1-1.3 (Repl. Vol. 1973). 
-7-
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This legislative recognition of the quasi-judicial nature of the 
Commission precludes Common Cause from arguing otherwise. The deli-
berations of the Commission are quasi-judicial. 
II. TH~ OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT OF 1977 
EXEMPTS JUDICIAL OR QUASI-JUDICIAL PRO-
CEEDINGS, AS IT MUST TO BE CONSTITUTIONAL 
(A) THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS ACT DOES NOT APPLY TO 
DELIBERATIONS OF AN AGENCY ACTING AS A QUASI-
JUDICIAL BODY. 
The above discussion establishes that the Commission acts as 
a quasi-judicial body when deliberating on the setting of rates or 
the granting of franchises. Common Cause argues that even should 
the Commission be considered a quasi-judicial body, its deliberatior.: 
must still be open to the public under the Open and Public Meetings 
Act. Neither the structure of the Open and Public Meetings Act nor 
analogous case law supports this position. 
The Open and Public Meetings Act was originally passed in 1955, 
and extensively amended in 1977. Common Cause argues that this 
amendment effectuated an absolute and blanket right in the public 
to attend any "public" meeting, regardless of the particular func-
tion being performed. However, a review of the Act does not suppor: 
this position. Public agency meetings covered by the Act are enumer· 
ated in the definition section, Utah Code Ann. §52-4-2 (Supp. 1977). 
That section provides, in subparagraph (2), that the meetings of a 
public agency covered by the statute apply only when the public 
agency is sitting as an "administrative, advisory, executive or 
legislative body of the state or its political subdivision . 
-8-
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The Legislature specifically omitted including a public agency act-
ing in a quasi-judicial function within the purview of the Act. This 
omission must be given effect, exempting the Commission when it exer-
cises its judicial or quasi-judicial function. 
Supportive of this construction is the fact that the Commis-
sion has always deliberated in private. The initial Open and Public 
Meeting Act was passed in 1955 and the Commission continued to deli-
berate in private after passage of that Act. This Court must assume 
that the 1977 Legislature was aware of this Commission practice when 
it amended the Open and Public Meetings Act. Given this knowledge and 
the Legislature's specific omission of public agencies acting in a 
quasi-judicial manner within the language of the Open and Public 
Meetings Act of 1977, it is clear that the Commission's quasi-judicial 
deliberations do not fall within either the specific language nor the 
overall policy of the Act. 
Common Cause argues for a strict interpretation of the Open and 
Public Meetings Act, which, they argue, would include the Commission 
in its deliberative, quasi-judicial functions. As has been pointed 
out, the specific language of the Open and Public Meetings Act does 
not compel opening the deliberative sessions of the Commission to the 
public, when the Commission is acting in a quasi-judicial manner. In 
addition, common sense requires that the quasi-judicial deliberative 
sessions of the Commission be closed to the public. The deliberations 
of judicial organizations, whether a judge or a jury acting as fact 
finder, have never been open to the public. The applicability of the 
Act for which Common Cause argues is inconsistent with the tradi-
-9-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tional judicial function envisioned under the American system. The 
traditional privacy of the deliberative process is a necessary con-
comitant of the candor which is required for effective interaction 
between the members of a fact finding body. The same candor is 
required among the Commission members. 
It is in recognition of this basic premise of judicial delibera. 1 
I 
tion that numerous courts have recognized an exemption to open meet· I· 
ings law for judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. It is for the same I 
reason that this Court should recognize this exemption. 
Numerous other states have recognized the unique nature of a 
public agency acting in a quasi-judicial manner and have read into 
similar open meeting acts a quasi-judicial exemption. Common Cause 
spends much of its brief attempting to distinguish these cases on 
technical grounds from the instant case. Technical distinctions, 
however, do not remove the fundamental basis of those cases -- quasi· 
judicial deliberations require some insulation from public scrutiny~ 
function effectively and fairly. A reading of these cases reveals 
that the holdings turn on a recognition by those courts of the analo· 
gous nature of the quasi-judicial proceedings of a public agency to 
the functions of a court of law or jury, and a willingness to attri-
bute to the Legislature a common sense exemption which will preserve 
the effectiveness of those quasi-judicial proceedings. See, ~ 
Press Club v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Appeals, supra; Jordan v. Dist. of 
Columbia, 362 A.2d 114 (D.C. 1976); Stillwater Savings & Loan Ass~ 
v. Oklahoma Savings & Loan Bd., 534 P.2d 9 (Okl. 1975); and the pe~ 
suasive dissenting opinion in Canney v. Bd. of Public Instruction~ 
Alachera Co., 278 So.2d 260 (Fla. 1973). 
-10-
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An exemption for quasi-judicial proceeding is consonant with the 
language of the Act, the purpose of the Act and case law from other 
jurisdictions. Additionally, such an exemption is necessary to 
insure the constitutionality of the Open and Public Meetings Act. 
(B) DUE PROCESS REQUIRES THAT THE OPEN AND PUBLIC MEET-
INGS AC'l' BE INTERPRETED AS EXEMPTING THE DELIBERA-
TIONS OF AN AGENCY ACTING IN A QUASI-JUDICIAL 
CAPACITY. 
The Open and Public Meetings Act is subject to two interpreta-
tions, either exempting or not exempting quasi-judicial functions of 
agencies. Only the former of these interpretations will insure the 
parties appearing before agencies acting as quasi-judicial bodies the 
requisite due process of law. This Court should therefore choose the 
former interpretation, thereby insuring the constitutionality of the 
Open and Public Meetings Act and the effectuation of the legislative 
mandate. 
Due process of law requires a fair hearing before an impartial 
tribunal. The analytical, deliberative function the Commission pursues 
in passing on individual rate and franchise hearings, conducted in 
privacy, allowing due consideration to discussion of matters of record 
and assuring that the final decision will be based only on the record, 
is an essential element of this Due Process requirement. The Comrnis-
sion does not seek to have "administrative . . • proceedings of a 
judicial nature held behind closed doors" (Resp. Br. pg. 27), which 
Common Cause correctly states would be repugnant to our system of 
justice. However, common Cause does not, and cannot, argue that 
closed door deliberative sessions are repugnant to our judicial sys-
tern, as that procedure is the traditional mode for formulation of a 
-11-
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final decision based on evidence offered in an open and fair hearins.· 
The analytical basis for closed door deliberations is that the 
decision should be based on the record only, and should not be sub-
ject to any extraneous influence. 
The Commission seeks the same insulation of its collective 
thought process from influence apart from the record which this Courtl 
enjoys. The Commission seeks this respite from the public eye to a 
very limited extent -- only when acting in a quasi-judicial manner 
and then only for deliberation on the record in order to reach a \ 
final decision. Contrary to Common Cause's contention, it is inherer.;( 
in due process that the final arbiter of a matter be free from the 
constraints of matters not of record. 
The record before the Commission is the result of a full adver-
sary hearing, with any "ir;.terested person" able to participate. The 
Commission hear~ng is where parties may legitimately exert influence. 
At the end of the open hearing, the parties are entitled to have ilie 
matter decided free from additional influence, based only on the 
record previously made in the adversary proceeding. 
The Commission in deliberating is no different from a jury or 
a judge acting as fact finder. This Court has recognized the import· 
ance of privacy for the fact finding deliberative process of a jury, 
calling the jury's privacy "sacrosanct" and cautioning that this pri·i 
vacy should "be preserved from influence from outside sources or acy 
semblance thereof." Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884, 
887-88 (1959). This same need for privacy has been recognized when 
the fact finder or decision maker is an administrative agency acting 
in a quasi-judicial manner. National Labor Relations Bd. v. Bota~ 
-12-
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worsted Mills, 106 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1939); United States v. Morgan, 
313 U.S. 409 (1941). The Arizona Press Club case recognized the need 
for privacy in a quasi-judicial body in order to assure the fair deci-
sion of the matter. To strip the Commission of its ability to insul-
ate itself from outside influences thereby assuring a decision on the 
record is violative of due process in that it deprives the Commission 
and the parties before it of the assurance that the Commission's 
decision is based only on the record. 
Common Cause argues that under the definition of due process 
contained in Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945) 
a closed deliberative session is not necessary to insure due process. 
This is contrary to the elements which Christiansen sets out as neces-
sary for due process. Christiansen dealt with the hearing process 
required for revocation of parole, and the issue of whether the deli-
berations of the fact finder were necessary to insure due process was 
not before the court. However, Christiansen did establish that: 
In depriving a person of life or liberty, the essen-
tials of due process are: [a fair hearing with 
notice and] (f) judgment to be rendered upon the 
record thus made. (163 P.2d 317). 
This final element of due process, that any decision be based solely 
on the record made in the prior fair hearing, is inherently offended 
by forcing the Commission to deliberate before the public, where 
matters extraneous to the record may influence them and the complete 
candor required for effective quasi-judicial decision making will be 
inhibited. To insure the constitutionality of the Open and Public 
Meetings Act, quasi-judicial agency functions must be exempted. 
Without such an exemption, the due process of law guaranteed the 
-13-
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parties appearing before the Commission by the Utah and United Statesl 
Constitutions will be violated. 
CONCLUSION 
The judicial deliberations of the Commission, when it votes 
upon, establishes, or otherwise evaluates existing or proposed 
utility rates, tolls and charges, rentals or classifications are 
entitled to the same right to privacy granted this court in its 
deliberations. Such private deliberations are necessary to insure 
candor among the decision makers, proper evaluation of evidence and 
witness credibility, and a decision based upon the record. Such pri·l 
vate deliberations are an essential element of the fair hearing be-
fore an impartial tribunal requirement of due process under the Utah 
and United States Constitutions. The trial court's construction of 
the Open and Public Meetings Act must therefore be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
:::::::::s:::~~::::t::~:~e . 'j 
Mountain States Legal Foundat~o 
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